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"One more large-scale maritime disaster ... should suffice to bring
the whole structure tumbling down."'

I. INTRODUCTION
On October 15, 2003, Richard J. Smith, while piloting the Andrew J.
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Barberi,2 "lost conscious[ness] or situational awareness due to
fatigue." 3 The ferry went off course and ran into maintenance pilings,
which resulted in the loss of eleven lives.4
Smith, the assistant captain, piloted the Barberi on its regular run
from New York City to Staten Island.5 According to the NTSB Report,
a lookout assisted Smith in the pilothouse until the ferry passed the Kill
van Kull buoy, then left to prepare the ferry for docking.6 The Barberi,
with a speed of fifteen knots, can traverse the distance from the Kull
buoy to the terminal in two minutes. 7
Smith, a fifty-five-year old man, was the assistant captain on board
the Barberi.8 Smith, apparently unknown to the New York City
Department of Transportation [NYC DOT], regularly took several
prescription medications for a wide range of problems including "high
blood pressure, high cholesterol, insomnia, and chronic back pain.
Smith arrived to work on October 15 completely exhausted due to
babysitting his grandchildren the previous day, but he neglected to
convey his fatigue to ferry management or to Captain Gansas, the other
Barberipilot.
Although both captains were on board the Barberi, the captain,
Gansas, was not present in the pilothouse while the Barberi was
2. The Barberi possesses the capacity to carry 6000 passengers and fifteen crew; it
weighs 3335 gross tonnage and has a service speed of sixteen knots. N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF
TRANSP., Staten Island Ferry, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/ html/ferrybus/statfery.shtml#fleet
(last visited Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Staten Island Profile]; see also NAT'L TRANS. SAFETY BD.
(NTSB), MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT: ALLISION OF STATEN ISLAND FERRY ANDREw J. BARBERI,
ST. GEORGE, STATEN ISLAND, NEW YORK, Oct. 15, 2003, at 19-20 (providing the Barberi's

certification and inspection results) [hereinafter cited as NTSB REPORT].
3. In re Complaint of the City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d 235, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2007);
In re City of New York, 522 F.3d 279, 280, 281 (2d Cir. 2008).
4. In re Complaint of the City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 236-37; NTSB REPORT,
supranote 2, at ii.
5. The Staten Island Ferry Service, operated by New York City's Department of
Transportation (DOT), transports commuters and tourists daily on the 5.2 mile run between
Staten Island and New York City. Staten Island Profile, supra note 2. On average, the ferries
carry 65,000 passengers daily, making over 110 daily trips. Id; see In re City of New York, 522
F.3d at 280 (stating that "Smith was at the helm.").
6. According to the NTSB REPORT, the Kill van Kull buoy is 1,000 yards away from the
Staten Island ferry terminal. Normally, the ferry begins to slow down upon reaching the buoy.
NTSB REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4; In re Complaint of the City ofNew York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at
237.
7.

NTSB REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.

8. In re Complaint of the City ofNew York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 236.
9. NTSB REPORT, supra note 2, at 13 (stating the assistant captain's medical status); see
also In re City oflNew York, 522 F.3d at 281. The court also acknowledged that Smith "in fact,
had previously falsely stated on a required Coast Guard form that he had no medical conditions
and did not take any medication." Id.
10. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol23/iss2/5

2

Doby: The Wreck of the Andrew J. Barberi: Revaluating the Role of the U

THE WRECK OFTHE ANDREW J. BARBERI

2011]

295

underway." The NYC Ferry Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
requires both the captain and assistant captain to remain in the
pilothouse for the duration of the voyage. However, the director of
was poorly disseminated
ferry operations later admitted that the SOP
14
13
paper.
on
only
existed
and
enforced,
and
11.

NTSB REPORT, supra note 2, at 61.

Given the circumstances, it is probable that (1) the captain considered it
acceptable, both operationally and in terms of the evaluation of his
performance, to be absent from the pilothouse for almost an entire voyage
without informing any other crewmember of his location, and (2) his absence
was sufficiently commonplace to have been accepted by those individuals
without comment.
Id.
12. In re Complaint of the City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 238-39 (referred to as the
"two-pilot rule");see also In re City of)New York, 522 F.3d at 281. But see NTSB REPORT, supra
note 2, at 61-62 (stating there were "conflicting interpretations of the existence of a requirement
for the vessel master to be present in the pilothouse after propulsion control had been
transferred," and that "no procedure . .. [r]equired the captain to enter and remain in the
pilothouse for the duration of the voyage once the transfer of propulsion control was complete").
13. The district court stated:
It is not surprising that the Staten Island Ferry's rules were not followed given
the haphazard way in which they were disseminated. At the time the accident
occurred, the internal rules were neither well understood nor effectively
enforced. The Staten Island Ferry had no formal safety management system.
There was no single manual that was readily accessible to crew members.
There was no mechanism to monitor who had received the procedures and at
what time. And there was no system for ensuring that the rules were actually
obeyed. Indeed, "there [were] no formal training programs at the Staten Island
Ferry. Instead, according to Captain Gansas, "there was 'on the job' training
and the policies and procedures were passed down from the Senior Captains
and Assistant Captains" by word of mouth.
In re Complaint of the City ofNew York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 238 (quoting Gansas Aff. 5); see
also NTSB REPORT, supra note 2, at 60 (stating that the "ferry operating procedures [] were
poorly understood, ineffectively disseminated, inconsistently applied, and inadequately
overseen").
14. In re Complaint of the City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 238 (stating Ryan's
knowledge of the written rule). Patrick Ryan, the director of ferry operations, in his criminal
plea "conceded that he knew that the Staten Island Ferry's Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) were not being followed." Id.
Subsequently, Ryan further stated: "Your Honor, I knew the rules [were not]
followed. I took measures to insure [that they were]. I drafted those SOPs. I
didn't adequately-I didn't get them out ... the right way. I didn't train people
in it. I didn't instruct people in it. I didn't get it dissimulated [sic] the right way.
I never followed up and enforced that."
Id. at 239 (quoting Ryan's Plea Allocution 53:17-25, Apr. 22, 2005).
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At roughly 15:20 EST, the Andrew J Barberi drifted off course
while maintainin a speed of fifteen knots and collided with a
maintenance pier. Captain Gansas reported that Smith, the assistant
captain, was slumped over the controls.16 Captain Gansas then took
"control of the vessel.

. .

. [B]y that time the allision had occurred."'

7

On the day of the accident, the Barberi carried an estimated 15,000
passengers and fifteen crew on board.1 8 Eleven' 9 passengers died from
the accident, and seventy people sustained injuries. 20 Smith's
exhaustion resulted in a loss of situational awareness, causing him to
have no memory of speed or position of the ferry until impacting the
pier. 21
The City of New York employed a nineteenth century maritime
statute, the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (LLA) 22 to file a petition
to limit, its liability to the post-accident value of the Andrew J Barberi,
approximately $14.4 million. 23 The concept of limiting liability began
as early as the tenth century, and very little has changed in the realm of
limiting liability since then.2 4 Legislatures adopted limitation of liability
statutes to protect shipping interests by restricting a shipowner's
personal liability surrounding accidents.2 5
15.
16.
17.

NTSB REPORT, supra note 2, at vi, 3-4.
Id. at 6.
Id. Allide comes from "Allision" which means the "striking or collision of a moving

vessel against a stationary
INTRODUCTION 386 (2008).

object."

MICHAEL MCNICHOLAS,

MARITIME SECURITY: AN

18. NTSB REPORT, supra note 2, at ii, vi.
19. Ten passengers died in the accident, and the eleventh died two months later as a result
of his injuries. Id.; see also In re City ofNew York, 522 F.3d at 281.
20. NTSB REPORT, supra note 2, at ii, vi; In re City ofNew York, 522 F.3d at 281.
21. In re City ofNew York, 522 F.3d at 281; see also NTSB REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
22. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 30505 (2006) [hereinafter LLA]. "The
[LLA] limits the owner of a vessel's liability for, among other things, 'any loss, damage, or
injury by collision ... done, occasioned, or incurred without the privily or knowledge of the
owner,' to 'the value of the vessel and pending freight."' In re City of New York, 522 F.3d at
283 (quoting § 30505(b)); see also 46 U.S.C.A. § 30511 (2006) (providing the procedure by
which to file a petition).
23. In re Complaint of the City of)New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 239. "[T]he owner [of a
vessel] . . . may ask that. . . his liability as owner shall be limited to the value of the vessel as

appraised after the occurrence of the loss . . ." Id. (quoting Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
v. S. Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 214 (1927)); Michael Luo, City Seeks To Limit Its Liability In
Ferry Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/06/
nyregion/city-seeks-to-limit-its-liability-in-ferry-crash.html?ref=Richardjsmith.
24. James J. Donovan, The Origins and Development of Limitation of Shipowners'
Liability, 53 TUL. L. REv. 999, 1001 (1979) (stating, "[t]he limitation of shipowners' liability
appears to have first developed in Italy . .. between the fall of the Western Roman Empire (454
A.D.) and the Crusades (1096-1291 A.D.)").
25. In re Complaint of the City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (stating that
"Congress passed the Act in 1851 'to encourage ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest
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Part I of this Article explores the historical policy reasons for
enacting limitation of liability statutes, and traces the beginning of
limitation of liability to its modem-day equivalent. Maritime transport,
particularly in the past, was regarded as a dangerous and "risky
business." Shipowners were held accountable not only for the actions
of its master and crew, but also for undertaking the perils of the sea.
"Any serious disaster would likely, especially in the old times, give rise
to the possible bankruptcy of the shipowner." 28 To reduce the inherent
risks and promote trade between nations, governments statutorily
granted a shipowner the ability to limit his personal liability to the value
of the ship in cases involving a collision, cargo damage, death, or
personal injury. 29 In 2009, the world's foremost shipping nations can
still be divided into two limitation theories: the "value" system and the
"tonnage" system. 30
Part II performs an in-depth analysis of today's modem "value" and
"tonnage" limitation schemes by focusing on the U.S. Limitation of
Liability Act of 1851, the 1976 Convention on the Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC), and the recent European Union
civil liability initiative. 3 1 The United States and the international
community roughly still abide by the limitation of liability schemes
devised in the 1700s. 32 The 1976 LLMC manages to harmonize civil
liability amongst the most of the world's shipping nations, but with a
rigidity that creates an almost unbreakable right for the owner to limit
his liability.3 3 In 2005, the European Union, in their civil liability
initiative, attempted to radically change the very concept of limitation of
liability. The European Union's attempt to revolutionize limitation of
liability failed, and was replaced by a mandatory insurance scheme.34
money in this branch of industry."' (quoting Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S.
104, 121 (1872)).
26. Donovan, supra note 24, at 1002; XIA CHEN, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR MARITIME
CLAIMS: A STUDY OF U.S. LAW, CHINESE LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS xiii (2001).
27. CHEN, supra note 26, at xiii (2001).
28. Id.
29. See id. at xiii-xiv; Donovan, supra note 24, at 1002-04, 1007-09, 1017, 1028.
30. See Donovan, supranote 24, at 1044.
31. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30505 (2006); Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime
Claims, 1976 (with final act), concluded Nov. 19, 1976, 1456 U.N.T.S. 24635 [hereinafter cited
as 1976 LLMC]; Press Release, Third Mar. Safety Package, EU Press Release MEMO/05/438
(Nov. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Third Maritime Safety Package].
32. See generally Donovan, supra note 24, at 1009-45 (discussing the American
development of shipowner limitation of liability).
33. Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliamentand the Council on the Civil
Liability and FinancialGuarantees of Shipowners, at 3, COM (2005) 593 final (Nov. 23, 2005)
(providing that "[t]he right of shipowners to limit their liability is [therefore] practically
unbreakable.") [hereinafter Proposed Directive].
34. See infra Part II.C.3.
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Part III analyzes the wreck of the Andrew J. Barberi through the
three modem limitation of liability schemes (the U.S. Limitation of
Liability Act of 1851, the 1976 LLMC, and the European Union's 2008
directive) to explore each scheme's strengths and weaknesses. The
Andrew J. Barberi case highlights the similarities, benefits, and
deficiencies of each of the three limitation schemes.
Finally, I conclude by questioning whether the underlying public
policy reasons for limitation of liability have changed. The European
Union's Proposed Directive failed to gamer enough political support,
but the Proposed Directive's existence demonstrates a need to address
the serious problems associated with the current application of
limitation of liability.

II. A HISTORY OF LIMITING LIABILITY IN SHIPPING
A. Value System
The exact origins of the limitation of a shipowners' liability remain a
mystery.3 5 In The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. claimed to
trace the doctrine of limiting liability to the value of the ship "to the
Roman legal principle of noxae deditio."36 Many scholars disagree with
Holmes's hypothesis and prefer to rely on the first evidence of the
doctrine of limitation of liability, which appeared in the Amalphitan
Table around the eleventh century. 7
Limitation of liability spread during the commercial revolution of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with its incorporation into the
Code of Valencia and Consulato del Mare of Barcelona. 38 During this
period, the modem European nation-states were emerging, and the
sovereigns attempted to use their divine right to codify international
maritime law. 39 The premier codification of Louis XIV, in his Marine
Ordinance of 1681, provided: "The owners of [the] ship shall be
answerable for the deeds of the master, but shall be discharged,
abandoning their ship and freight." 40 The Ordinance of 1681 eventually
"became at once the universal law of maritime nations."41 The French
Code de Commerce of 1807 incorporated the Ordinance of 1681, which
eventually was adopted into the Code Napoleon.42 The Ordinance of
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Donovan, supra note 24, at 1000.
Id. (referencing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 14 (2005)).
Id. at 1000-01.
Id.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1004.
Id.
Id. (quoting The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373, 377 (D. Me. 1831).
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1681 was highl regarded as non-authoritative "evidence of the general
maritime law.' By the nineteenth century, most of continental Europe
adopted the idea that shipowners' have the right to limit their personal
liability to the value of ship post-accident, known as the "value"
system.4
B. Tonnage System
Limitation of liability remained confined to Continental Europe until
1733.45 In 1733, the King's Bench in Boucher v. Lawson held a group
of English shipowners personally liable for the full value of the cargo of
bullion, which was stolen by the master after it was loaded in
Portugal.46 Because of the decision, English shipowners and merchants
strongly petitioned the English Parliament for relief from this
decision. "The petitioners added that Parliament should realize 'that
unless some provision be made for their relief, trade and navigation will
be greatly discouraged, since owners of ships find themselves . . .
exposed to ruin."' 8
The English Parliament yielded to the demands of the shipping
industry by passing the Responsibility of Shipowners' Act of 1733. In
adopting this Act, the British parliament cited the need for its shipping
industry to keep pace with Continental Europe's shipping industry,
which had already possessed the protection of limitation of liability for
several years.5 0 The Act copied Continental Europe's provision that
limitation of liability could only apply when the incident occurred
without the "privity or knowledge" of the owner.5 1 However, the Act
did not put English shipping on equal footing with Continental
Europe. 5 2 The English adopted a rule that provided that "the extent of
the owner's liability was calculated on the value of the vessel
immediately prior to the incident, rather than on the continental postaccident formula." 53 "Under this rule [an English] ship-owner found it
[in] his best interest to send ill-found ships to sea and to refrain from
increasing their value by repairs." 54 The British system was the basis for
43. Id. at 1005 (quoting Morgan v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 4 Dall. 455, 458 (Pa. 1806)).
44. See id. at 1004-05.
45. Id. at 1007.
46. Id. (referencing Boucher v. Lawson, (1734) 95 Eng. Rep. 53).
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting H.C. JOUR. (1733) 277).
49. Id.; CHEN, supra note 26, at xiv; Responsibility of Shipowners' Act, 1733, 7 GEO. 2,
c. 15 (1734).
50. Donovan, supra note 24, at 1007-08.
51.

Id.

52. Id. at 1008.
53. Id.
54. Id. Donovan also states that the English passed two other acts that slightly varied
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the "tonnage" system, in which the weight of the ship determined
absolutely the amount that a shipowner could limit his liability and the
amount the injured party could recover.55
Limitation of liability made its first appearance in the United States
in 1819.56 "Statutes similar in principle to the English acts were passed
in 1818 and 1821 by the legislatures of Massachusetts and Maine,
differing slightly in form.',s Massachusetts incorporated the 1734
enactment of the British rule directly into its state statutes. Maine
followed Massachusetts' lead by adopting a "very 'similar"' provision
into its legislation. 59 Despite these statutes' similarity to the English
statute law, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of decisions beginning
with Norwich & N.Y. TransportationCo. v. Wright created an important
distinction between the English and American limitation of liability
systems by requiring U.S. courts to consider the negligence of the
shipowner. 60

III. IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS

OF MODERN DAY LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY SCHEMES

A. UnitedStates' Twist to the Value System
On January 13, 1840, William F. Harnden shipped a wooden crate
on board the steamship Lexington from New York to Providence, Rhode
Island. 6 1 According to the terms of the contract, Haraden shipped the
crate with no declaration of its contents and completely at his own
risk.62 After leaving New York, the steamship Lexington caught fire,
taking the lives of many of the crew and passengers, destroying most of
the cargo, and destroying the vessel itself.63 Harmden's wooden crate
held eighteen thousand dollars worth of bank checks and drafts that
limitation of liability by including robbery and negligence in the event of collision under the
fold of limitation of liability. Id. at 1007-08.
55. Id. at 1007-09.
56. Id. at 1009.
57. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104, 119 (1871).
58. See Donovan, supra note 24, at 1009; An Act to Encourage Trade and Navigation
within this Commonwealth, 1818 Mass. Acts ch. 122 (1819, repealed 1902).
59. Donovan, supra note 24, at 1009 (citing George C. Sprague, Limitation of Ship
Owners' Liability, 12 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 568, 576 (1935)); see also Wright, 80 U.S. at 120
(explaining "[t]he laws of Maine and Massachusetts seem to have limited the shipowner's
liability in cases of damage to cargo alone; and for complete relief, they refer him to a
proceeding in equity").
60. Wright, 80 U.S. at 118-19.
61. N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. 344, 346-47 (1848).
62. Id. at 346.
63. Id. at 347.
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were to be delivered to Hamden's employers-the Merchants' Bank of
Boston.6 4 The Merchants' Bank of Boston sued the owners of the
Lexington.65 The Supreme Court in 1848 stated that a shipowner could
not contract away his liability "to use ordinary care in the custody of
goods, and in their delivery, and to prove proper . . . means of

conveyance for their transportation." 66
The Lexington Supreme Court decision provided the same stimulus
to the American shipping industry as Boucher v. Lawson did in
England. 67 The shipping industry lobbied Congress to protect their
interests by adopting a limitation of liability statute.68 Senators briefly
argued that the bill would hamper the free market, but the bill passed
within a day, placing "[the American] commercial marine upon an equal
footing [as that of England]."69 Congress ultimately enacted the LLA,7 0
which was designed to shield shipowners from ruinous liability.'
The LLA lay dormant until 1866, when the owners of the City of
Norwich steamship, which sunk following a collision, claimed the
statute's protection. 2 The Norwich court found the statute to be "so
imperfect, fragmentary, and ambiguous as to be unworkable." 73 The
statute reads "the liability of the owner of a vessel for any claim, debt,
or liability described in subsection (b) shall not exceed the value of the
vessel and pending freight." 74 The statute left open whether the
assessment of the ship's value should be pre-accident or post-accident.
64. Id.; Donovan, supra note 24, at 1011.
65. N.J. Steam Navigation Co., 47 U.S. at 380, 382.
66. Id. at 383.
67. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 128 (1893) (stating that "[t]he attention of
congress does not seem to have been called to the necessity for similar legislation until 1848,
when the case of The Lexington, reported under the name of New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v.
Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, was decided by this Court."); see also Donovan, supra note 24,
at 1007.
68. Donovan, supra note 24, at 1012.
69. Sprague, supra note 59, at 578; see Wright, 80 U.S. at 121 (stating "[tihe great object
of the law was to encourage ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest money in this
branch of industry").
70. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30505 (2006). For a history of the development of American limitation
of liability, see The Main, 152 U.S. at 126-28 (tracing briefly the appearances of limitation of
liability from the 1500s to 1800s.); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 818-24 (explaining the
American roots of limitation of liability).
71. In re Complaint of Mowhawk Assocs., 897 F. Supp. 906, 909 (D. Md. 1995).
72. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-2, at 818-20; see Wright, 80 U.S. at 106-07.
73.

GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-2, at 820.

74. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30505 (2006).
75. Wright, 80 U.S. at 120; see also Place v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468,
490 (1886) (considering "what time ought the value of the vessel and her pending freight to be
taken, in fixing the amount of her owners' liability? Ought it to be taken as it was immediately
before the collision, or afterwards? And if afterwards, at what time afterwards?") In Place, the
Supreme Court granted certiorarito the same parties as in Wright to determine when the value
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The Norwich court interpreted Congress's intent to unequivocally limit
a shipowners' liability to the value of the ship post-incident, which
meant in that case that the recovery value could be $0 or $100.76
The other major question the Norwich court considered was whether
the word "interest" in the LLA covered insurance proceeds. The court
held that interest only "refer[red] to the extent or amount of ownership
which the party had in the vessel . . . insurance which a person has on

property is not an interest in the property itself, but is a collateral
contract ... not conferring upon him any interest in the property." 78 The
court opined that if the insurance proceeds were considered interest,
then the post-incident value of the vessel becomes meaningless, and in
effect would "bring back the law to the English rule . .. the very thing

which, in all our decisions on the subject, we have held it was the
intention of [C]ongress to avoid ...
Subsequent cases attempted to limit the scope of the LLA by arguing
the Act did not apply to collisions, loss by fire, personal injuries, lost
property, or property damage.8 0 The Supreme Court dismissed such
notions by firmly stating, "if [these] positions[s] can be maintained, the
value of the act, as an encouragement to engage in the shipping
business, will be very essentially impaired." 8 The LLA mandates that
shipowners must limit their losses to a value not greater than the value
of their ship. 82 The LLA, however, provides certain procedural
safeguards that attempt to protect the injured third-party interests.
One procedural safeguard lies in the statute's requirement that the

of the vessel should be determined and whether the word "interest" in the LLA included
insurance proceeds. Id.
76. Place, 118 U.S. at 490.
77. Id. at 493 (considering "whether the petitioners were bound to account for the
insurance money received by them for the loss of the steamer as a part of their interest in the
same. . . . [and whether] insurance [is] an interest in the vessel or freight insured, within the
meaning of the law?").
78. Id. at 493-94.
79. Id. at 505.
80. Butler v. Boston & Savannah S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 550 (1889).
Various attempts have been made to narrow the objects of the statute, but
without avail. It was first contended that it did not apply to collisions. This
pretense was disallowed by the decision in Norwich Co. v. Wright [sic], 13
Wall. 104. Next it was insisted that it did not extend to cases of loss by fire.
This point was overruled in the case of Steam-Ship Co. v. Manufacturing
Co. [sic], 109 U.S. 578.
Id.
8 1. Id.
82. 46 U.S.C.A.

§ 30505(a) (2006); Wright, 80 U.S. at 123.
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owner must submit a petition to the court in order to limit his liability. 83
Therefore, the LLA does not confer an immediate grant of limitation of
liability to shipowners. 84 In order to limit their liability, shipowners
must petition a U.S. District Court by filing a complaint within six
months from receipt of written notice of a claim for damages.8 5 Once
the complaint is filed, the court automatically stays all proceedings for
damage or loss against the shipowner until the court decides the
outcome of the owner's limitation claim. 86
After receipt of the petition, the LLA institutes the second safeguard
by placing the burden of proof to support the petition on the shipowner
and not on the injured plaintiff. The shipowner must "show [to the court
that] it lacked privity or knowledge87 of the condition" which caused the
accident. A shipowner's "privity or knowledge" of the cause of the
accident destroys his ability to limit his liability. 89 Modem American
courts construe "privity or knowledge" broadly to include whether the
shipowner had constructive knowledge of the accident-whether he
should have or could have known about the cause of the accident. 90
Constructive knowledge encompasses the condition and operation of a
vessel as well as the competence of both managerial personnel and the
crew of the ship. A failure by the owner of the vessel to exercise due
diligence in assuring that the vessel was seaworthy, which results in loss
or damage, will defeat any plea for limitation of liability.91
However, courts are quick to point out that "mere negligence of a
crew member does not mean that owner could have or should have
prevented such negligence." 92
83. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30511 (2006).
84. See id.
85. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rule F requires the owner to petition
in suits for limitation for liability, and imposes a strict six-month deadline. GERARD J.
MANGONE, UNITED STATES ADMIRALTY LAW 189 (1997).
86. Id. at 190 (stating that "[w]here the facts alleged by the shipowner show no
possibility that the owner could limit his liability, the federal court may dismiss the complaint").
87. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30505(b); see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-20, at 877-79.
88. In re Kristie Leigh Enters., Inc., 72 F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 1996). The court stated,
"[a] corporate owner, however, will not satisfy its burden by merely demonstrating ignorance. It
is charged with the knowledge of any of its managing agents who have authority over the sphere
of activities in question." Id.; see also Cupit v. McClanahan Contractors, Inc., I F.3d 346, 348
(5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 410 (1943)).
89.

See MANGONE, supra note 85, at 191.

90. Id.
91. See id. (suggesting that modem technology, e.g., rapid communications systems,
places a higher burden on the shipowner to exerciser reasonable diligence in foreseeing
conditions that might cause accidents).
92. See id; see also In re Kristie Leigh Enters., Inc., 72 F.3d at 481 (quoting Continental
Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1377 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Rubin, J.), "no court
has previously denied a corporate shipowner limitation of liability for a master's navigational
errors at sea when the owner has exercised reasonable care in selecting the master"); see also
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Many scholars note that the phrase "privity or knowledge [is an]
exceedingly poor guide[] to the investor concerning what he must do or
avoid in order to obtain limitation." 93 The phrase "[p]rivity or
knowledge" is such a vague concept that it is an "empty container[] into
which the courts are free to pour whatever content they will." 94
Scholars detest the American method for determining how much
funds are available to plaintiffs as "the worst feature of United States
limitation law. It is based on the fortune de mer concept, which has been
loosely translated as a 'floating crap game."' 95 The American rule limits
liability to the post-accident value of the wreck. 96 The compensation, in
other words, available to the injured, the injured families, or the other
creditors, depends on the value of the vessel after the accident. 9 7
Therefore, the size of the disaster determines the monetary
compensation, and, the bigger the disaster, the less money available in
damages for plaintiffs.
The practical effect of the fortune de mer method is that courts
employing common law principles of equity render "fair" judgments
that leave the plaintiffs with an inequitable result. The courts usually
find it easier to find evidence of a subjective intent that destroys the
owner's ability to limit his liability, removing the inequitable remedy
for the plaintiffs. 98 Greenman argues that the courts' attempt to balance

Coryell, 317 U.S. at 410 (providing "the negligence is that of an executive officer, manager or
superintendent whose scope of authority includes supervision over the phase of the business out
of which the loss or injury occurred"); see also Continental Oil Co., 706 F.2d at 1376 (noting
"[t]he navigational negligence of a master who also occupies a managerial position in a
corporation does not of itself deprive the corporation of the right to petition for limited
liability"); see also In re Complaint of Patton-Tully Transp. Co., 797 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1986)
(providing the corporate officers' and managers' privity or knowledge is not based on actual
knowledge but what the officers and managers should have known); see also Tittle v. Aldacosta,
544 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) (providing "this is to afford protection to the physically
remote owner who, after the ship breaks grounds, has no effective control over his water-borne
servants"); Cupit, 1 F.3d at 348 (considering the employee's scope and authority and noting the
employee's "authority did not extend to the basic business decisions made by the drilling
supervisors and the president of the company"); In re the Complaint of Hellenic Inc., 252 F.3d
391 (5th Cir. 2001) (providing eight factors to determine whether a corporate employee's may
preclude limitation of liability).
93. Donald C. Greenman, Limitation of Liability: A CriticalAnalysis of United States
Law in an InternationalSetting, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1139, 1145 (1983).
94. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, § 10-20; see also Gibboney v. Wright, 517 F.2d
1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating "[w]hat is meant by privity or knowledge is not easy to pin
down"); Fecht v. Makowski, 406 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 1975) (relaying "the meaning of
'privity or knowledge' has been the subject of considerable speculation").
95. Greenman, supra note 93, at 1174.
96. Place, 118 U.S. at 490.
97. Id.
98. Greenman, supra note 93, at 1174.
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the situation renders the statute unpredictable and inconsistent. The
vagueness of "privity or knowledge" and the fortune de mer method
strip the shipping industry of its ability to remotely predict the outcome
of suits.' 00 To add to the confusion, courts also employ several other
common law exceptions where the LLA does not apply.' 0 ' These
common law exceptions protect the plaintiffs' interests, but make it
difficult to predict the outcome of litigation.
Gilmore and Black argue that the statute only continues to exist in its
current form due to the fact that suits involving limitation of liability
claims are so rare; that "[i]t is, perhaps, not unreasonable to conclude
that if the cases just discussed have not been litigated in the past
hundred and twenty-five years, they will probably not be litigated in the
next hundred and twenty-five either." 02 The LLA remains unchanged
despite overwhelming criticism from maritime scholars. Unfortunately,
the maritime community appears to be the only group advocating to
amend the statute while the LLA remains largely ignored by Congress
and the public. Perhaps, as Gilmore and Black suggest, this vague
statute will not be revised until a large-scale maritime disaster
concludes in an inequitable result for the public.' 0 3
B. 1976 Convention on Limitation ofLiability
In an attempt to synchronize the shipping industry, several
international conventions 0 4 were convened to discuss the limitation of
liability. 05 None of these conventions were particularly successful in
99. Id. at 1173-74.
100. See id. at 1174.
101. MANGONE, supra note 85, at 194. Common law exceptions to limitation of liability
are
where the loss is (a) the consequence of personal contract; (b) a claim for
maintenance and cure and/or wages due to employees of the shipowner; (c)
due to marine pollution where a statute pre-empts limitation; (d) under
contracts of affreightment where there has been impermissible deviation and
in charter parties; and (e) the result of a violation of the Wreck Removal Act
by failing to mark and/or remove a wreck.
Id. at 193.
102.

GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1,

§

10-49, at 957.

103. Id. at 956-57.
104. 1924 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the
Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, Aug. 24, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter the 1924 Convention]; 1957 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of
Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships, and Protocol of Signature, Oct. 10, 1957, 1412
U.N.T.S. 23642 [hereinafter the 1957 Convention].
105. For brevity, I have omitted the individual history of the 1924 and 1957 Conventions,
which laid the foundation for the 1976 LLMC. See Erling Selvig, An Introduction to the 1976
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securing worldwide consensus until the Convention on the Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims of 1976 (1976 LLMC).106 Even then, the
1976 LLMC opened for signature on November 19, 1976, but did not
enter force until December 1, 1986.107 Thus, in 1986, the international
community began using the standards of the 1976 LLMC. 0 8
The 1996 LLMC provides specific limitation amounts109 for loss of
life/personal injury and property damage claims, such as damage to
other ships, property, or harbors, and sets up a system of sliding scales
that determine the limitation of funds of different sized vessels."10 For
example, for personal claims, a vessel weighing 500 tons or less
restricts the liability of the shipowners to 333,000 units of account."'
However, for each additional ton between 501-3,000 tons, 500 units of
account must be added to the initial 333,000 units."12
The unit of account refers to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
"Special Drawing Right (SDR)."ll 3 The value of the SDR is calculated
on a basket of key international currencies, which is reevaluated every
five years.' 14 The tonnage of the vessel is multiplied by the SDR to
reach a value, which is then converted into the member state's
currency.' If a country does not belong to the IMF, the unit of account
Convention, in THE LIMITATION OF SHIPOWNERS' LIABILITY: THE NEW LAW 3,3-17 (1986).

106. See 1976 LLMC, supra note 31; see Selvig, supra note 105, at 4-17 (discussing the
1924 Convention, the 1957 Convention, and the 1976 LLMC).
107. IMO.org, Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC),
http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/convention-on-limitation-of-liab
ility-for-maritime-claims-(llmc).aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) [hereinafter IMO.org]; see 1976
LLMC, supra note 31, art. 17.

108. See IMO.org, supra note 107.
109. Protocol of 1996 to Amend the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime
Claims of Nov. 19, 1976, adopted May 2, 1996, 1456 U.N.T.S. 24635 (entered into force May
13, 2004) [hereinafter the 1996 Protocol]. The 1996 Protocol exists separate from the 1976
LLMC. Id. arts. 9(1), (2), & (4). Those countries that signed the 1976 LLMC are not required to
ratify the 1996 Protocol, and a country may subscribe to the 1996 Protocol without signing the
1976 LLMC. Id. art. 9(4). The 1996 Protocol increased the amount of compensation payable
after an incident. Id. art. 3 (replacing 1976 LLMC art. 6(1) for general claims); Id. art. 4
(replacing 1976 LLMC art. 7(1) for personal claims).
110. 1976 LLMC, supra note 31, arts. 2(1), (6).
111. Id. art. 6(1)(a)(i); see also id. art. 8 (providing that "unit" in the 1976 LLMC refers to
International Monetary Fund (IMF) "Special Drawing Right (SDR)"). If a country does not
belong to the IMF, the unit of account "shall be calculated in a manner determined by that State
Party." Id.
112. 1976 LLMC, supra note 31, art. 6(1)(a)(ii); see also CHEN, supra note 26, at 88.
113. 1976 LLMC, supra note 31, art. 8.
114. Currently, the basket contains the Euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and U.S. dollar.
Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Determines New Currency Weights for SDR
Valuation Basket (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/
pr10434.htm.
115. See 1976 LLMC, supra note 31, art. 8(1).
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"shall be calculated in a manner determined by that State Party."" 6
The 1976 LLMC manages to restrict the class of people that may
limit liability by defining specific categories of people who possess the
option to limit their liability." 7 Article 1 defines specific categories of
people who possess the option to limit their liability, 18 providing the
person's conduct does not violate Article 4 of the 1976 LLMC."' 9 After
qualifying under Article 1, the 1976 LLMC grants the automatic right to
limit liability.120 To prevent limitation, the complainant (plaintiff)
carries the burden to prove that the Article 1 owner's conduct prohibits
limitation of liability from attaching.121
Article 4 of the 1976 LLMC provides the conduct which bars an
owner from limiting his liability as "[a] person liable shall not be
entitled to limit his liability if it [was] proved that the loss resulted from
his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such
loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably
result."l 22 Article 4 represents the "most radical change in the
philosophy underlying the concept of a shipowner's right to limit the
extent of his liability for his acts and those of his servants"l 23 by
requiring proofof loss resulting from the "personal act or omission" of
the person liable for the loss.' "In addition to a high burden of proof,
the "personal act or omission" must be "committed with the intent to
cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would
probably result." 25 Whether an owner's conduct bars the 1976 LLMC's
116.

Id. art. 8.

117.

PATRICK GRIGGS ET AL., LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR MARITIME CLAIMS 7-10 (4th

ed. 2005).
118.

1976 LLMC, supra note 31, art. I (providing those categories of persons entitled to

limit their liability). Also note, that while the 1976 LLMC restricts the persons who may limit
their liability, the definition of ship includes "any structure (whether completed or in course of
completion) launched and intended for use in navigation as a ship or part of a ship." See MARTIN
DOCKRAY, CASES & MATERIALS ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA 347 (3d ed. 2004).

119. 1976 LLMC, supra note 31, art. 4 (detailing the conduct which eliminates the
owner's right to limit his liability.).
120.

NORMAN A. MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL

MARITIME CONVENTIONS 69 (2011) (citing The "Capitan San Luis" court's reasoning that "[t]he
shipowner merely has to establish that the claim falls within art 2 of the convention. Once he
establishes that, he is entitled to a decree limiting his liability, unless the claimant proves the
facts required by Article 4").
121. Id.
122. 1976 LLMC, supra note 31, art. 4. The LLA requires a different standard by allowing
limitation to attach only if the loss occurred "without the privity or knowledge of the owner." 46
U.S.C.A § 30505(b) (2006).
123. GRIGGS ETAL., supranote 117, at 31.
124. Id. at 37 (noting that Article 4 references "loss" without any reference to life, injury,
or property damage, but Griggs submit[s] that the word "loss" "is plainly intended to encompass
all the various types of loss or damage or injury or expense to which Article 2 refers").
125. 1976 LLMC, supra note 31, art. 4; GRIGGS ETAL., supra note 117, at 32.
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protection, directly relates to who seeks to invoke the claim of

limitation.126
The key to this convoluted definition is in understanding the link
between a personalact or omission and a person liable. The language of
Article 4 broadly refers to "a person liable" without providing a
concrete definition for "person."' Although the 1976 LLMC remains
vague, maritime scholars tend to agree that the Article 4 "person" refers
to the parties identified in Article 1 categories.128 Assuming "person"
refers to an Article 1 party, the personal acts of an Article 1 owner will
prevent the owner from limiting his liability. However, that leaves the
question as to what classifies as a "personal act" of an Article 1 owner.
An Article 1 owner will not be stripped of the ability to limit his
liability unless a claimant (plaintiff) establishes proof of the owner's
personal act that caused such loss. What constitutes proof of a personal
act? The 1976 LLMC sets the plaintiffs burden of proof quite high.12 9
Griggs pinpoints the words "such loss" in Article 4 as indicators of what
plaintiffs must prove.1 30 He maintains that "such loss" means an
owner's right to limit is only barred if "the type of loss intended or
envisaged by the 'person liable' is the actual loss suffered by the
claimant."l 3' In other words, the "person liable" for the accident must
have the mens rea to cause the maritime loss in order to defeat
limitation of liability.1 32 Under the 1976 LLMC, the "person liable"
must have "actively intended the loss." 33 It is not sufficient that a
reasonable person should have or could have known that an action could
have lead to damage.' 34 However, national courts still maintain some
discretion in determining the meaning of "actively intended." For
example, Britain construes this passage to include the reckless acts of an
owner who carelessly or heedlessly does not "[consider] the probability
or even the possibility of a likely result." 3 5
In the modem era of multinational corporations, a struggle emerges
to link an employee's actions with the corporate body. When do the
126. 1976 LLMC, supra note 31, art. 4.
127. Id.
128. Id. arts. 1(1)-(2), (6) (defining "persons entitled to limit liability" as shipowners,
salvors, and certain insurers). The category of "shipowner" includes "owner[s], charter[s],
manager[s], and operator[s] of [] seagoing ship[s]." Id. art. 1(2).
129.

GRIGGS ET AL., supra note 117, at 38.

130. Id.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. See id
133. Id.
134. Id. The LLA also requires the act of an owner to break limitation, but requires a
significantly lower threshold to prove the personal act, by the inclusion of constructive
knowledge.
135. Id. at 39.
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actions of an employee become classified as the "personal act" of the
owner? Courts strain to link the employee to the corporate owner within
the terms of the 1976 LLMC.136 As the number of corporations steadily
increased, most of the countries who adopted the 1976 LLMC
developed the "alter ego" concept.13 7 The "alter ego" legal fiction
focuses on whether the individual whose action or inaction lead to the
accident was the "the very action of the company itself." 38
The 1976 LLMC provides a uniform and predictable method for the
shipping industry to write off their losses, but at an extreme cost to
potential plaintiffs. The 1976 LLMC saddles plaintiffs with an
extremely high burden of proof with no practical means of obtaining
such proof.'3 Noting the plaintiff s predicament, the Commission of the
European Union (Commission)140 investigated the 1976 LLMC's effect
on plaintiffs and reported that the 1976 LLMC established a virtually
unbreakable right of a shipowner to limit his liability. 141
C. European Union's Third Maritime Safety Package
The recent maritime disasters, namely the Erika and Prestige oil
tanker accidents prompted the European Union to reconsider its
maritime safety strategy.142 The Commission also analyzed the extent to
which it should aim to restrict shipowners' ability to limit their financial

136. Id
137. Lennard's Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., (1915) A.C. 705, 713-14 (H.L.).
[U]pon the true construction of [section 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act of
1894] in such a case as the present one that the fault or privity is the fault or
privity of somebody who is not merely a servant or agent for whom the
company is liable upon the footing respondeat superior, but somebody for
whom the company is liable because his action is the very action of the
company itself.
Id.
138. See Lady Gwendolen, (C.A.) [1965] P. 294, 343-44.
139. See Proposed Directive, supra note 33, at 3. Plaintiffs must establish that a shipowner
was negligent or grossly negligent, a difficult threshold to breach. Id.
140. Id. at 1.
141. Id. at 3.
142. Communicationfrom the Commission to the EuropeanParliamentand to the Council
on Improving Safety at Sea in Response to the PrestigeAccident, at 4, 10, COM (2002) 681 final
(Dec. 3, 2002); see also Resolution on Improving Safety at Sea, EUR. PARL. Doc. P5_TA 350
(2004), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef--//EP//NONSG
ML+TA+P5-TA-2004-0350+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN;
Decision Setting Up a Temporary
Committee on Improving Safety at Sea, EUR. PARL. Doc. P5 TA-Prov 483 (2003), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eulmeetdocs/committees/mare/20031126/p5_ta-prov(2003)0483_e
n.pdf.
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liability.143
The Commission reported that the 1976 LLMC provided shipowners
with "almost complete limitation of operator liability." 44 The
Commission recognized that shipowners only lost the right to limit their
liability if the plaintiffs "proved that the damage 'resulted from [the
shipowner's] his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to
cause such damage, or reckless, and with the knowledge that such
damage would probably result.'"
The Commission found that "negligence or even gross negligence on
behalf of the owner does not meet these criteria and it is evident that in
most circumstances it would be very difficult to breach this threshold.
...

The right of shipowners to limit their liability is [therefore]

practically unbreakable." 46 In response, the Commission introduced the
Third Maritime Safety Package' containing seven distinct proposals
creating standardized rules for all Member States and some third party
countries. 148 The seventh proposal "[a] Directive on the extracontractual liability of shipowners,"I9 is aimed to reduce shipowners'
"traditional right to limit their liability in the event of grave
negligence"' 5 0 in order to make operators more accountable and ensure
adequate compensation for victims. 5 1 In its proposal, the Commission
asserted that Member States lack the monitoring systems to adequately
control civil liability,152 and therefore aimed to increase the European
Union's ability "to coordinate the essential points of existing national
legislation, such as removing ceilings on civil liability and making

143. Communicationfrom the Commission to the European Parliamentand to the Council
on Improving Safety at Sea in Response to the PrestigeAccident, supra note 142, at 10.
144. Proposed Directive, supra note 33, at 3.
145. Id. (referring to the intent required to break limitation contained in Article 4 of the
1976 LLMC).
146. Id.
147. Third Maritime Safety Package, supra note 31.
148. The Maritime Safety Package contains seven distinct proposals which are as follows:
compliance with flag State requirements; common rules and standards for ship inspection and
survey; port State control; Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system;
investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sections; liability of carriers of passengers
by sea and inland waterways in the event of accidents; and civil liability and financial
guarantees of shipowners. See id.
149. Id.; see also Parliament Tightens EU Maritime-Safety Rules, EuRAciv.coM (Mar.
29, 2007), http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/parliament-tightens-eu-maritime-safety-rules/
article-162888 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
150. Third Maritime Safety Package, supra note 31.
151. Id.
152. Proposed Directive, supra note 33, at 7-8 (providing "[tihe minimal legislation drawn
at
Community level ties in with national civil liability legislation. As regards obligatory
up
insurance, the conditions for issue certificates are not harmonised . . .").
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1. Components of the Proposed Directive
The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the
Council on the Civil Liability and Financial Guarantees of Shipowners
(Proposed Directive) 5 4 possesses four main components that
significantly alter the European Union's approach to civil liability: (1)
Article 4 requires Member States to become contracting parties to the
1996 Protocol;' 55 (2) The Proposed Directive calls for the incorporation
of the 1996 Protocol into European Community law;'5 6 (3) Article 7
imposes upon Member States the requirement to issue certificates for
financial guarantees to all of their flag ships,157 and Article 5 requires
Member States to ensure that every owner passing through their
Exclusive Economic Zone possesses a financial guarantee for civil
liability;"'s and (4) The Proposed Directive creates a new threshold for
barring limitation of liability in Article 4 by stating that a shipowner
will "lose[] the right to limit his liability if it is proved that the damage
resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to
cause such damage, or through gross negligence." 59
The first two components of the Proposed Directive ultimately aim
to "establish stringent liability rules applicable to all ships." 6 0
Recognizing that European Union Member States account for
approximately seventeen percent of the world's trade in goods via
maritime shiping,16 1 the European Union seeks to circumvent the
"slow pace"' of implementing international conventions by ensuring
"swift[] and uniform[] appli[cation]" of its financial guarantee
system.' 6 3 Through the Member States' uniform application of the 1996
Protocol, the European Union attempts to wield the contracting Member
States as a bloc to push for revisions to IMO international conventions

153. Id. at 8.
154. Id. at 1.
155. Id. at 13.
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id. at 14. Article 7 sets forth the procedural requirements for how Member States
should certify their flag ships with financial guarantees. Id.
158. Id. at 13.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 6.
161.

External and Intra-European Union Trade, EUROSTAT EUROPEAN COMMISSION 11

(2010), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITYOFFPUB/KS-CV-10-001/EN/
KS-CV-10-001-EN.PDF (reporting that EU-27 contributed values of 1,094 billion Euros of the
world's export and 1,199 billion Euros of the world's import).
162. Proposed Directive, supra note 33, at 5.
163. See id.
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for limitation of liability.164
At the same time, the Proposed Directive indirectly creates
repercussions for non-European Union (third party) nations who
traverse through European Union waters. "[S]hips flying the flag of a
State that is not party to [the 1996 Protocol will be] subject to a more
severe liability regime with gross negligence as conduct barring
limitation."' 65 The subjection to "a more severe liability regime"
indirectly requires, or at the very least serves as an incentive, for thirdparty nations to become parties to the 1996 Protocol. 166
The third part of the Proposed Directive sets up a system of
obligatory financial guarantees and insurance requirements in the hopes
of removing ceilings on liability.167 The Proposed Directive requires
"the financial guarantee must be a sum equivalent to double the ceilings
laid down in the [1996 Protocol]." 6 8 Article 9 provides for mutual
recognition of one Member State's financial guarantee by all other
Member States; however, Member States do have the right to "request
an exchange of views" with the other Member States if they should
"believe that the insurer or guarantor named on the certificate is not
financially capable of meeting the obligations imposed by this
[Proposed] Directive."169 The Proposed Directive, in Article 5, also
possesses consequences for third- party countries because Member
States must ensure that any third-party flag ships traveling within the
Member State's Exclusive Economic Zone possess a financial guarantee
as well.' 70
Finally, the Proposed Directive would replace the "reckless with
knowledge" international convention threshold for barringshipowners'
rights to limit liability with a "gross negligence" standard. 1 The "gross
negligence" standard might serve to balance the interests of the shipping
industry versus the injured party. The "gross negligence" standard, by
directly contradicting the 1976 LLMC standard, creates confusion as to
which standard should apply in the aftermath of an accident.17 2
164. See id. at 4.
165. Id. at 7.
166. See id. at 4.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 15.
170. Id. at 13.
171. See id. at 3.
172. Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the 3rd Maritime Safety Package, 2006
O.J. (C 229) 49.
[D]isparity between this Directive and the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the
Hamburg Rules, governing shipowners' liability under Bills of Lading, Sea
Waybills and Charter parties as used in international maritime transport, which
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The Commission, in its Proposed Directive, introduced several
preventative measures aimed at resolving deficiencies with the 1976
LLMC's application of limitation of liability. The Proposed Directive's
financial guarantee system would help eliminate the existence of
substandard ships by harmonizing the Member States' rules for
shipowners' liability and financial guarantees. 1 73 Implementing the
financial guarantee system, however, requires the passage of national
legislation and regulations, rather than working with the measures
currently in place. The Proposed Directive's removal of ceilings and
obligatory insurance requirements increases the ability of injured
plaintiffs to recover. 7 5 However, it remains unclear which accidents
should employ the 1976 LLMC standard, and which should employ the
"gross negligence" standard. The next section fully explores the
practical problems with implementing the Proposed Directive.
2. Proposed Directive on Civil Liability Scuppered
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union announced on
April 23, 2008 that "[w]hereas the Council has already adopted
common positions on five proposals of [the Third Maritime Safety
Package], no majority could be found on [the proposal for civil
liability]."l 76 In the Council of Ministers' vote, only five of the twentyseven Member States backed the civil liability directive.' 7 7 Lloyd's List
reported the European Union civil liability "to be 'shelved
indefinitely."'" 8 Gilles Savary, Euro MP and rapporetur, was "very
surprised at the reaction in the council because the European parliament
has voted massively in favour [of the civil liability directive]." 79
The Proposed Directive, despite Parliament's approval, 80
may give rise to confusion as to which liability regime would apply as it is felt
that the wording of this Directive does not make it totally clear whether it
applies to pollution damage only, or whether it includes other damage to third
parties.
Id.
173. See Proposed Directive, supra note 33, at 11.
174. Id. at 8.
175. Id. at 6.
176. Presidency, Report on Proceedings in the Council's Other Configurations, at 7,
8700/08 POLGEN 40 (Apr. 23, 2008).
177. Justin Stares, EU Civil Liability Directive to be 'Shelved Indefinitely,' LLOYD'S LIST,
Apr. 24, 2008, availableat http://folk.uio.no/erikrolWWW/HNS/press/LL25apr08.pdf.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Legislative Resolution of 29 March 2007 on the Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Civil Liability and Financial Guarantees of
Shipowners, EUR. PARL. Doc. P6_TA 94 (2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
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encountered strong opposition from the shipping industry.'' The
International Shipping Foundation and International Chamber of
Shipping strongly opposed the proposed civil liability directive.' 82
Moreover, Stares reported that P&I Clubs argue that
The financial guarantee provisions ... will be irrelevant to and

will not positively contribute to issues of ship standards/safety or
loss prevention and . . . will create a very substantial and
unnecessary administrative burden on states . . . ." "There is a

perfectly workable and effective system of evidencing insurance
in place through certificates of entry which are issued to all
vessels entered in the Group clubs.' 8 3
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) opinionl84
appears to agree with the industry. The EESC views individual Member
State financial guarantees as creating an unnecessary administrative
burden when financial guarantees could continue to be issued by P&I
Clubs.' The EESC noted the industry's reluctance to provide financial
security certificates covering double the 1996 Protocol limits.
According to the EESC opinion, "P & I Clubs have declared that they
are not willing to provide certificates exceeding the level laid down in
[the] 1996 LLMC Protocol."' 86 The EESC, however, heavily
encouraged the Commission to take further steps to encourage Member
States to ratify the 1996 Protocol.' 8 7 The EESC concluded its opinion
by requesting that the Commission undertake an economic analysis of
whether the civil liability regime should be adapted or thrown out
altogether. 188
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C: 2008:027E:0166:0166:EN:PDF.
181. Press Release, ICS and ISF Meet in Washington DC, Int'l Chamber of Shipping (May
10, 2006), available at http://www.marisec.org/2006.htm#10/5/06.
182. Id.
183. Stares, supra note 177.
184. Eur. Econ. & Soc. Comm. [EESC], Opinion of the European Economic and Social
Committee on the Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliamentand of the Council on
Proposalfor a Directive of the EuropeanParliamentand the Council on the Civil Liability and
FinancialGuarantees ofShipowners, 2006 O.J. (C 318/32), § 4.7.1 (Dec. 23, 2006) [hereinafter
EESC opinion].
185. See id. § 4.7.4.3.
186. Id. § 4.7.2.
187. Id. § 4.7.4 (noting the EESC's "perception and estimation of extent of damage and
responsibility have changed a great deal over recent years;" and that the EESC requested "the
Commission carry out an economic analysis of its proposal"); see also id § 4.7.5 (stating the
EESC's belief "that the proposal, in its present form, is in conflict with Directive 2004/35/EC of
21 April 2004 ... which recognized the primary application of IMO Conventions, including the
LLMC").
188. Communicationfrom the Commission to the EuropeanParliament,at 4, COM (2008)
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3. Amendments to the Proposed Directive
On December 9, 2008, the Council and Parliament responded to the
concerns of the industry, the EESC, and the Committee of the Regions
in the "common position" on the civil liability directive.' 8 9 The common
position's compromises were fully adopted into a new directive, the
Directive on the Insurance of Shipowners for Maritime Claims
(Directive),190 replacing the Proposed Directive.191 The title shift alone
indicates that the emphasis shifted from reforming civil liability to a
compulsory insurance requirement for all Member State ships plus any
ship entering Member State waters.
The Directive removes the previous Proposed Directive's
requirement for Member States to ratify the 1996 Protocol through
Community law.' 92 Alternatively, Member States agreed to individually
ratify the 1996 Protocol by January 1, 2012.193 The Member States'
agreement to ratify the 1996 Protocol appears to fulfill the Proposed
Directive's aim to ratify the 1996 Protocol at the Community level. The
effects of individual Member State ratification, however, lead to very
different results. The Proposed Directive intended to incorporate the
1996 Protocol into the Community to provide uniformity amongst the
Member States. Alas, by allowing the Member States to individually
ratify the 1996 Protocol, the Member States are now free to choose how
to implement the treaty into national law, killing any hope of
uniformity.
The Directive requires obligatory insurance coverage, yet removes
the Member States' enforcement obligation to ensure ships comply with
the Directive's insurance and financial guarantee requirements.' 94
Additionally, ships are not required to present the Member States with
their insurance certificate upon entry into the Member State's maritime
area.
The obligatory insurance coverage must correspond to the ceilings
set forth in the 1996 Protocol for all Member States' flag ships and
ships entering Member State ports.196 Each ship must display a
846 final (Sept. 12, 2008) (providing the Member States' obligation to have insurance).
189. Council Common Position (EC) No. 29/2008 of 9 Dec. 2008, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (C
330), at 7 (stating that "[t]his Directive lays down rules applicable to certain aspects of the
obligations on shipowners as regards their insurance for maritime claims").
190. Council Directive 2009/20, 2009 O.J. (L 131) 128-31 (EC) [hereinafter Directive].
191. Proposed Directive, supra note 33, at 1-31.
192. Directive, supra note 190, at 128.
193. Council of the Eur. Union, Statement by the Member States on Maritime Safety,
15859/08 ADD 1, 13 (Nov. 19, 2008).
194. Directive, supra note 190, art. 4, at 129.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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commercial insurance certificate to be shown upon inspection in
accordance with Port State Control Directive.197 If a ship does not
possess an insurance certificate, the ship may be detained or expelled
"without prejudice" by the Member State, who has the discretion to
issue a financial penalty.19 The Directive postpones the enforcement
date until January 1, 2012, the date by which all Member States should
have adopted the 1996 Protocol. 199
Despite the drastic changes from the Proposed Directive, the
Directive manages to target, and to hopefully resolve, a major problem
of substandard ships within the maritime community. According to the
ECSA newsletter, some ships lack basic insurance to cover their
proceeds. 200 The Directive, at least, ensures that all ships entering
European Union waters possess minimum insurance coverage set out by
the 1996 Protocol. 20 1 Therefore, the European Union Directive's
obligatory insurance requirement will help eliminate substandard ships
and provide basic protection for accidents.
The Proposed Directive provided a platform to push the Member
States to agree to individually ratify the 1996 Protocol, but individual
ratification means the Member States decide how to incorporate the
1996 Protocol into their national legislation. The Member States,
therefore, retain significant discretionary powers at the national court
level. The Directive mandates obligatory insurance without providing
any cohesive or coordinated measures to regulate and monitor the
system. In short, the Directive fails to address the exact problems the
European Commission identified in the Proposed Directive.
The recent European Union legislation hopefully marks the
beginning of reevaluating the issue of limitation of liability. The
original impetus for enacting limitation of liability statutes was to
encourage investment and trade, and to promote competitiveness in the
197. Id. art. 6, at 129.
198. Id. arts. 5, 7, at 129.
199. Id. art. 9, at 130.
200. ECSA NEWSLETTER, (Eur. Community Shipowners' Assoc. (ECSA), Brussels, Belg.),
Jan. 2006, at 4, available at http://www.ecsa.be/newsletters/061.pdf.
201. 1996 Protocol, supra note 109, art. 3 (replacing article 6(1) of the 1976 LLMC with
the following minimum limits for claims, except those listed in article 7 of the 1976 LLMC: "for
loss of life or personal injury, (i) 2 million Units of Account for [ships : 2,000 tons] ... for each
ton from 2,001 to 3,000 tons [add 800 units/ton.]; for each ton between 30,001 to 70,000 tons
[add 600 units/ton]; for each ton in excess of 70,000 tons [add 400 units/ton)... . in respect to
any other claims," the limitation amounts are as follows: "1 million Units of Account for [ships
5 2,000 tons], for each ton from 2,001 to 3,000 tons [add 400 units/ton]; for each ton from
30,001 to 70,000 tons [add 300 units/ton]; and for each ton in excess of 70,000 tons [add 200
units/ton]"); see also id. art. 4 (replacing article 7 of the 1976 LLMC with "for loss of life or
personal injury to passengers of a ship, the limit of liability of the shipowner thereof shall be an
amount of 175,000 Units of Account multiplied by the number of passengers which the ship is
authorized to carry according to the ship's certificate").
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when one shipwreck had the potential to ruin
early days ofshipp%
Commission, in its Proposed Directive,
The
an entire company.
appeared to believe that the historical policy reasons for limitation of
liability did not warrant the 1976 LLMC unbreakable chain of
protection for shipowners.2 04 Have increases in technology, insurance
markets, and government subsidies rendered the underlying policy
205
reasons for adopting limitation of liability obsolete?
IV. ANDREWJ. BARBERI: THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF MODERN
DAY APPROACHES

A. Andrew J. Barberi and the U.S. "Value" System
In accordance with the LLA, the City of New York filed a petition in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York to limit its
liability.206 Unlike the 1976 LLMC, where shipowners are entitled to
automatic protection, the LLA requires the "owner" (here, the City of
New York), not the plaintiff, to prove the lack of "privity or
knowledge." 2 0 7
The district court, reviewing the City's petition, considered the
"privity or knowledge" of Patrick Ryan as the director of ferry
first addressed the question of what constitutes
operations.208 The court 209
The LLA provides no clues, 210 and in the
"privity or knowledge."
absence of statutory guidance, courts have long employed the common
law reasonable care standard of negligence to judge "privity or
knowledge." 2 11 The district court assessed Ryan's privity or knowledge
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Donovan, supra note 24, at 1002.
CHEN, supra note 26, at xiii.
Proposed Directive, supra note 33, at 3.
CHEN, supra note 26, at xv.
In re Complaint of the City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d 235, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
See id.
Id. at 239-40.
The Supreme Court has ruled that, when a ship is owned by a corporation,
liability may not be limited "where the negligence is that of an executive
officer, manager or superintendent whose scope of authority includes
supervision over the phase of the business out of which the loss or injury
occurred."

Id. (quoting Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 410 (1943)); see also supra text accompanying
note 92 (providing several cases which determine when an employee's negligence may be
imputed to the corporation).
209. See In re Complaintofthe City ofNew York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
210. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 92.
211. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 87-94 (generally stating that there is very
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by the common law reasonable care standard for negligence. 2 12
The district court held that the City not only foresaw the possibility
of pilot incapacitation, but drafted a rule to prevent such accidents from
occurring.21 The City simply failed to enforce the rule. 2 14 Ryan
admitted the Ferry had adopted Standard Operating Procedures (SOP),
internal regulations requiring that the captain and the assistant captain
both be in the pilothouse at all times while the Ferry was underway.215
Unfortunately, the SOP were poorly disseminated and enforced, and
effectively existed only on paper. 2 16 The district court noted that "[t]his
rule could have easily been complied with on the Barberi,because there
were two pilots on the vessels at all times. Instead, Captain Gansas
spent the entire voyage in the aft, or Manhattan-facing pilothouse. Had
Gansas been present, the disaster would have been avoided." 2 17 The
district court, therefore, denied the City's petition to limit its liability. 218
The City appealed the district court's ruling, and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's finding of

little statutory guidance for LLA "privity or knowledge," and therefore it is judged by the
common law reasonable care standard of negligence, encompassing what should have been or
could have been known).
212. In re Complaint of the City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (stating that a
shipowner owes a duty to her passengers to exercise "reasonable care under the circumstances."
(quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959))).
213. Id. at 238-39.
214. Id. Compare id. with In re Complaint of Sea Wolf Marine Towing & Transp., Inc.,
No. 03-CV-5578 (KMW)(THK), 2007 WL 3340931, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2007) (holding
that the Captain's negligence was not within the privity or knowledge of the owner. The Court
distinguished In re Complaint of the City ofNew York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 235 by stating:
The [In re Complaint of the City of New York] court found that while the twopilot rule was written, it was "neither well understood nor effectively
enforced." In contrast, Sea Wolf Marine did not establish written protocol
regarding weather conditions, visibility, or adherence to the lookout rule. But as
discussed above, Captain Sprague understood how to proceed regarding each of
these matters. . . . Amtrak criticizes Sea Wolf Marine's distribution, content,
updating, and lack of compliance mechanisms for the vessel policy manual and
employee safety manual. Despite this broad argument, Amtrak fails to set forth
specific facts that these alleged deficiencies in any way contributed to or caused
the collision. Therefore, the Court need not address Sea Wolf Marine's
knowledge or privity of the allegedly haphazard dissemination of its other
safety rules and regulations.
In re Complaint of Sea Wolf Marine Towing & Transp., Inc., No. 03-CV-5578 (KMW)(THK),
2007 WL 3340931, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2007) (internal citations omitted).
215. In re Complaint of the City ofNew York, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
216. Id. at 238-39.
217. Id. at 238.
218. Id. at 248.
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negligence de novo. 2 19 The Second Circuit held that "[u]nder admiralty
law, the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes a duty to its
the circumstances."'220
passengers to exercise 'reasonable care under
The court considered the City's duty to the Barberi passengers by
looking to Judge Learned Hand's formula for determining the
reasonable standard of care, set out in United States v. Carroll Towing
Co.22 1
In determining the City's "burden of adequate precaution," 222 the
court noted that the City already employed and maintained two licensed
pilots on the Barberi, so the City would not incur any additional cost by
requiring two licensed pilots to remain at, or near, the pilothouse during
the operation of the ferry. 223 The Second Circuit, therefore, found that
the City had a relatively small burden to prevent accidents resulting
from pilot incapacitation. 2 24 "[T]he City is not entitled to limit its
liability if Director of Ferry Operations Patrick Ryan's admitted failure
to enforce a 'two-pilot rule,' requiring the captain and assistant captain
to be in the operative pilothouse while the ship is underwa , constituted
negligence that was causally connected to the crash." 2 The court,
therefore, affirmed the District Court's decision to deny the City's
petition to limit its liability, stating: "[b]ecause Ryan failed to enforce
not only a strict two-pilot rule but any policy that would meet even this
minimum applicable standard of care, we find that the negligence was
within the privity or knowledge of the City." 226 As of 2008, "123 of 186
lawsuits have been settled for a total of $34 million," 227 whereas the
City, if the courts granted their petition, could limit its liability to just
$14.4 million, the post-accident value of the Barberi.2 28 The fickle
outcome of an accident should not determine the future compensation
available to injured parties. 229
If the courts had allowed the City to limit its liability, would the
219. In re City of New York, 522 F.3d 279, 282 (2d Cir. 2008).
220. Id. at 283 (quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625,
632 (1959)).
221. Id. at 284 (applying Judge Learned Hand's formula for determining reasonable care,
as found in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), the court
stated that "whether the burden of adequate precautions (B) is less than the gravity of the injury
(L) discounted by the probability that the injury will occur (P), i.e., whether B< PL").
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 283-84.
225. Id. at 283.
226. Id.
227. Stefanie Cohen, Ferry Victim Gets $6.5M, N.Y. POST, Feb. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/itemQBC157ZP3SXDwA4CkIAluO.
228. In re Complaint of the City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d 235, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
229. See Greenman, supra note 93, at 1174 (fortune de mer" method); see also supra text
accompanying note 101 for a discussion on common law exceptions to limitations of liability.
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Barberi wreck have served as the incentive to revise the American
concept of limitation of liability? While the Barberi is unlikely the
"large-scale maritime disaster" envisioned by Professor Gilmore, 2 0 the
Barberi wreck did receive nationwide attention following the aftermath
of 9/11.231 The New York Times, which followed the criminal and civil
lawsuits, disdainfully remarked that the City sought to limit its liability
by invoking a "19th-century maritime statute." 23 It is likely that if the
City's claim had been successful, the media would have extensively and
publicly explored this "19th-century maritime statute" in greater detail.
When, not if, the media discovered that all injured plaintiffs' claims
would be limited to the post-accident value of the wreck, which would
have ranged from zero dollars to fourteen million dollars, the resulting
public outrage might have finally led to the revision of the LLA. The
judiciary, practitioners, and scholars, despite their frustration with the
statute, have been unable to make any significant changes to the statute
in the last one hundred years.
B. Barberi and the 1976 LLMC "Tonnage" System
The Andrew J. Barberi accident demonstrates several key
differences between the American LLA and the 1976 LLMC, such as:
when liability attaches; the requisite knowledge to bar a limitation
claim; and the determination of a ship's value. In the Barberi case, the
City petitioned for a claim of liability, but it failed to prove that it
lacked "privity or knowledge" of the accident.2 34 The 1976 LLMC
eliminates many of the City's hurdles. The 1976 LLMC would
automatically entitle the City to limit its liability. Additionally, the 1976
LLMC shifts the burden from the City to the plaintiffs to prove that it
had actual knowledge (meaning the City's action or inaction directly
caused the ferry damage).
Despite the higher burden of proof, a court applying the 1976 LLMC
would most likely find the City liable for damages. The question,
however, truly depends on how the individual Member State adopts the
1976 LLMC into national legislation and how the state courts treat the
director of ferry operations: as either simply a servant or the "alter ego"
of the company.
The United Kingdom is a Member State that has wholly adopted the
1976 LLMC directly into its national legislation. According to the

230. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 823,
231. See, e.g., Luo, supra note 23, at Bl.
232. Id.
233. Greenman, supra note 93, at 1174.
234. In re City of New York, 522 F.3d 279, 282 (2d Cir. 2008).
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British Merchant Shipping Act,235 the "alter ego" of the company allows
faceless corporations to be held liable for their actions or inactions.
According to the "alter ego" analysis, the ferry director must constitute
"the very action of the company itself."2 37
In the Lady Gwendolen, the assistant managing director of a brewing
company was not specifically authorized to act in the board's name, but
his duties rendered him the person ultimately responsible for the
company's shipping traffic. 23 8 The court found that his daily duties to
direct the traffic could constitute the "very action" of the company for
ship traffic management and held that the collision did not take place
without the actual fault or privity of the owner, and that the owning
company was barred from limiting its liability. 239
Like the Lady Gwenodolen case, Patrick Ryan, the director of ferry
operations for the City, was the person ultimately responsible for
promulgating, monitoring, enforcing, and ensuring that rules were
followed, and he was authorized by the City to perform those
the
functions.240 Ryan promulgated a safety protocol. 24 1 He knew
242
He
protocol was not correctly disseminated to the ferry employees.
knew the protocol was not being followed, and he failed to correct the
More importantly, the safety protocol was specifically
situation.
aimed at preventing the Barberi situation from occurring. 2" Therefore,
the collision was a direct result of Ryan's inaction. The British system,
therefore, would most likely find that the City did not act without actual
fault or privity of the owner, and would bar the City from limiting its
liability.
For a moment, assume that the British system did not bar the City
from invoking its limitation claim. The British system evaluates the
value of the vessel by the "tonnage" rule.24 5 To calculate tonnage for
any personal injury claims, one takes the tonnage of the vessel prior to
the accident and multiplies it by the units of accounts (SDR). 46 The
235. Merchant Shipping Act of 1995, c. 21, § 185, availableat http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/1995/21/contents.
236. See, e.g., GRIGGS ETAL., supra note 117, at 31; Lady Gwendolen, [1965] P. 294, 298;
Lennard's Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co.,(1915) A.C. 705, 713-14 (H.L.).
237. See, e.g., Lady Gwendolen, (C.A.) [1965] P. 294, 298; Lennard's Carrying Co. v.
Asiatic Petroleum Co., (1915) A.C. 705, 713-14 (H.L.).
238. Lady Gwendolen, P. 294 at 304.
239. Id. at 343-48.
240. In re Complaint of the City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d 235, 238-39 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
241. Id.
242.

Id.

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.B.
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Barberi weighed approximately 2,800 gross tons, 24 7 which falls into the
second range of between 501-3,000 tons.24 8 For the first 500 tons, the
City limits its liability to 333,000 SDR, but for each additional ton, the
amount increases by 500 SDR.24 9 For 2,800 tons, the City would be able
to limit its liability to 1,150,000 SDR.
The SDR (Special Drawing Right) is calculated daily and valued at
0.6209500000.210 Using a convoluted formula, 1,150,000 SDR converts
into $1,852,000.251 Therefore, the City may limit its liability for
personal injury or loss of life claims to $1,852,000.
Fund for Personal Claims
Tonnage of Vessel
300-500
501-3,000
3001-30,000
30,001-70,000
in excess of 70,000

Units of Account
333,000
each additional ton
500
333
167
167

For any other claims, the City would be able to limit its liability for
the 2,800-ton Barberi vessel to 551,100 SDR, which converts to
$887,511.

247. See In re City of New York, 522 F.3d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating the Barberi
"displaced 2712 long tons").
248. See supra Part II.B.
249. See id
250. As of Wednesday, Nov. 25, 2009, the IMF website evaluates 1 SDR equals 1.61 USD
and 1 USD equals 0.620950 SDR. Please see http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data
param- rms_mth.aspx for daily SDR valuations and exchange rate archives.
251. See IMF, Articles of Agreement of the InternationalMonetary Fund, art. XV, § 2,
received Apr. 25, 1947, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (entered into force Dec. 27, 1945)
(providing the "valuation of the special drawing right."), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/aa/aal 5.htm#2; see also IMF, Selected Decisions and Documents of the IMF,
Thirty-Fourth issue, art. XV, § 2, at 709-11, Decision No. 12281-(00/98) as amended by
Decision No. 13595-(05/99), available at http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/2010/Selected
decisionsand selected documents oftheInternational MonetaryFund Thirty-fourth.pdf
(providing "SDR Valuation Basket-Revised Guidelines for Calculation of Currency Amounts");
id. art. XV, § 2, at 712-13, Decision No. 6709-(80/189) as amended by Decision No. 12157(00/24) (providing the "Method of Collecting Rates for the Calculation of the Value of the SDR
for the Purposes of Rule 0-2(a)).
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Fund for Other Claims
Tonnage of Vessel
300-500
501-30,000
30,001-70,000
in excess of 70,000
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Units of Account
167,000
each additional ton
167
125
83

The Barberi wreck resulted in eleven deaths, nineteen severely
injured passengers, and fifty-seven passengers who suffered minor
injuries. 5 2 Under the 1976 LLMC, the injured plaintiffs' personal
claims would have been limited to a paltry $1.9 million, even less than
the LLA limitation of $14.4 million. At first glance, these numbers
suggest that the American "value" system provides greater
compensation and protection for the injured plaintiffs. The
compensation and protection, however, provided by the American
"value" system depends entirely on the state of the vessel after the
wreck. For example, assuming the post-accident value of the Barberi
vessel was $10, the injured plaintiffs would only receive $10 to cover
their injuries and suffering.
Society has a strong interest in ensuring consistent court judgments,
but common law courts tend to avoid inequitable results. Although the
rigid and mechanical formulations of the 1976 LLMC could provide the
necessary consistent litigation results, it completely favors shipowners,
even to the wrongful detriment of the injured party. The 1976 LLMC's
rigidness should be balanced with a lower standard than "actual
knowledge," or with the removal of the shipowner's automatic right to
limit his liability.
C. The European Union Directive
The amended European Union Directive acts as a supplement to the
current limitation of liability regime. By mandating that ships carry
insurance double the 1996 LLMC limits, the directive provides a
minimum level of coverage for victims and losses, but it does not limit
the shipowner's ability to limit losses greater than insurance
coverage. 25 4 Thus, the Directive would have automatically allowed the
Barberi victims access to a greater compensation fund. However, the
Directive fails to address the fundamental problem that the 1976 LLMC

252. In re City ofNew York, 522 F.3d at 281.
253. See Greenman, supra note 93, 1173-74; MANGONE, supra note 85, at 192-93.
254. Proposed Directive, supra note 33, at 3.
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grants shipowners the "unbreakable" right to limit their liability. 255 in
other words, under the European Union Directive, the City of New York
possessed the automatic right to limit its liability, and the families of the
deceased or injured had to prove the wreck was a result of the City's
personal act. Ryan, the director of ferry operations, neglected to
properly disseminate and enforce the two-pilot rule, but Ryan was
unaware of Smith's fatigue, or his medical condition, on the day of the
accident. 256 Ryan, therefore, did not possess the necessary mens rea to
intend for the accident to occur. Under the European Union Directive,
the City of New York would likely be able to limit its liability to
approximately $1.9 million.2 57
Under the Proposed Directive, the City still possessed the automatic
right to limit its liability. However, in order to break the City's
limitation, the plaintiffs had only to demonstrate that the City's gross
negligence led to the accident-a much lower threshold than the 1976
LLMC "actual fault" standard. Ryan specifically created the two-pilot
rule in order to prevent accidents resulting from one pilot's
incapacitation, but he simply failed to enforce the rule.2 58 Ryan's failure
directly created the situation which led to the Barberi wreck. Courts
would likely rule that the City's failure to enforce the two-pilot rule was
the City's grossly negligent act, and subsequently bar the City from
limiting its liability.
V. CONCLUSION
As Professor Gilmore once predicted, "[o]ne more large-scale
maritime disaster . . . should suffice to bring the whole [limitation of

liability] structure tumbling down."2 5 9 It appears that Professor Gilmore
was partially correct. It took the Erika and Prestige shipwrecks to
induce the European Commission to investigate the effects of the 1976
LLMC. After discovering the shipowner's right to limit liability under
the 1976 LLMC was "practically unbreakable," 260 the Commission
aimed to reform the concept of limitation of liability in the Proposed
Directive.261 The Proposed Directive failed in its reform efforts, but in
its wake, tough questions arose as to whose interests society should
protect.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
See supra Introduction.
See supra Part III.B (regarding the 1976 LLMC calculation of the Barberiwreck).
See supra Introduction.

259.

GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 823.

260. Proposed Directive, supra note 33, at 3.

261.

Id.
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The 1976 LLMC provides predictability, but it heavily favors the
shipping industry by affording automatic protection to owners and by
shouldering plaintiffs with a high burden to prove "actual fault or
privity." The American "value" system, on the other hand, provides
better protection for plaintiffs at the outset by requiring the owner to
prove the lack of "privity or knowledge" of the circumstances leading to
the accident. However, if American courts allow the owner to limit his
liability, the amount of compensation available to plaintiffs depends on
whether the vessel survived the accident relatively intact-truly a
floating craps game. Because of this floating craps game, American
courts tend to wield the subjective intent standard as a sword to reach an
equitable result that avoids any unjust awards to the plaintiffs or
defendants, which makes predicting the outcome of litigation difficult.
The Commission attempted to correct the problems with limitation of
liability in two ways: (1) providing a cohesive regulatory and
monitoring system aimed to eliminate substandard ships;262 and (2)
providing greater protection to injured parties by lowering the "actual
fault" standard to a "gross negligence" standard.2 6 3 Despite its failure,
the creation of the Proposed Directive demonstrated the Commission's
recognition and desire to alter the inherent unfairness in limitation of
liability. The U.S. Congress should recognize that the same inherent
unfairness exists in the LLA, and reconsider whether the current
limitation of liability approach meets modern shipping needs, and if it
does not, whether revision or abolishment is appropriate.

262.
263.

See supra Part II.C.1 (providing a uniform regulatory system.).
See supra Part II.C. 1 (citing the Proposed Directive's gross negligence standard.).
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